University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2017

Do Judges Know Best?
James Allan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Allan, James, "Do Judges Know Best?" (2017). Constitutional Commentary. 464.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/464

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

ALLAN_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/11/17 7:04 AM

DO JUDGES KNOW BEST?
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER. By Ilya
Somin.1 Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 2016
(Second Edition). Pp. xiv + 291. $27.95 (cloth).
James Allan2
Labels are notoriously slippery tools. Just think of the debate
between “natural law adherents” and “legal positivists” on the
nature of law. Whether the holders of these two views are in fact
disagreeing at all depends on what you take to be the content
behind the respective labels.3 Or take the two camps of legal
positivism, the “internal legal positivists” and the “external legal
positivists.” Are they in fact disagreeing about whether, at least
sometimes, moral norms can be among the legal determinants of
the law (so not just social facts determine the law in all legal
systems ever to have existed), or is this debate merely one of
terminology and of no real significance?4 Again, your answer may
be influenced by what you take to fall within the aegis of these
two accounts of the nature of law. The point is that we humans
cannot think at all without labels, but at times we cannot think
well with them.
And that brings me to those of us who think comparatively
smaller government tends to produce better human welfare
outcomes than bigger government; who favor giving individual
humans plenty of scope to make calls for themselves (when it
comes to what they can say and much else); and who think the
1. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
2. Garrick Professor of Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland.
3. For example, Larry Alexander says this: “On this account, positivists and natural
lawyers are not disagreeing, for they are each discussing the nature of a different thing.
The positivists are discussing law, the natural lawyers, LAW [i.e. non-degraded, true law].
Neither need deny the others’ claims.” Larry Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist?, in
THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN 299, 307 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds.,
Oxford, 2016).
4. See James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003).
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private sector usually out-produces the public sector. That
package of views would describe me. Yet I would not describe
myself as a “libertarian.” Too many self-described libertarians
seem to me to hold core-level views that are grounded in natural
rights thinking where I am at core a consequentialist. Likewise, a
good many libertarians leave me uncertain that they would be
prepared to make anything like the compromises I would make as
regards national security and national sovereignty and just
generally Hobbesian “we live in a dangerous world” concerns.
Thirdly, and no less importantly, most libertarians do not seem to
share my views about democracy, by which I mean majoritarian
“let the numbers count” democracy.5 I see it as the least-bad
decision-making option available, and certainly a good deal better
than the sort of strong judicial review that exists in my native
Canada or in the United States, where nearly all (Canada) or
probably most (the United States) top judges adopt some version
of a “living tree”6 or “living Constitution” interpretive approach,
under which these same unelected judges end up deciding a whole
host of social policy issues.7
So I am inclined to shun the label “libertarian.” My guess is
that the author of this fine book, Democracy and Political
Ignorance, would welcome it. Yet, as regards the first-order
substantive issues related to one’s ideal size of government or the
desirable scope individuals ought to be left with to shape their
own lives, Professor Somin and I seem to be broadly in agreement.
However, on the question of democracy, and when the majority
5. See JAMES ALLAN, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: STEPS IN THE WRONG
DIRECTION (2014).
6. This phrase was made famous, in the Westminster common law world, by Lord
Sankey in the Privy Council case from Canada of Edwards v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1930]
A.C. 124 (Can. P.C.). This “living tree” term is the broad equivalent outside the United
States for what Americans describe as a “living Constitution” approach.
7. The list of such issues in the United States will be well known to readers. In
Canada the list includes same-sex marriage (Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2003] O.J.
No. 2268 (Can. Ont. C.A.); euthanasia (Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2015] S.C.C. 5);
the scope of free speech (in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R.
199 (Can.), it was held that restrictions on tobacco advertising were inconsistent with the
freedom of expression, but this was overruled in Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. JTI-Macdonald
Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (Can.)); the treatment of those claiming to be refugees (Singh
v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t and Immigr.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.)); whether prisoners
can vote (Sauv. . . v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519
(Can.), overruling Sauv. . . v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2000] 2 F.C. 117 (Can.
C.A.)); whether Parliament can prevent inroads into the scope of the one-size-fits-all
nationalised health system (Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), 2005 S.C.C. 35, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 791 (Can.)); and so on.
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ought to prevail, we clearly are not. That said, and I will return to
say more below, this is a book well worth reading. It is an updated
second edition packed with interesting details, with the careful
elucidation of arguments and counter-arguments, with the telling
aperçu, and all in the service of the book’s main theme, that voters
are on the whole pretty ignorant, and, more to the point, that this
ignorance is probably rational from their point of view. Nor is this
thesis put forward in the service of arguing for ways to make
voters better informed about political matters. Somin tells us at
the end of chapter seven, the final chapter before his conclusion,
that “the painful reality is that we cannot count on any major
increase in political knowledge in the foreseeable future” (p. 223).
No, this thesis about voter ignorance is basically part and parcel
of a larger critique of majoritarianism. Think of it as the plaintiff’s
brief for judicially enforced constitutional rights of a broadly
Richard Epsteinian sort.
Now I reject that desired end point or core position for
reasons I will sketch out in a moment. Nevertheless, I am very
glad that I read this book. It was stimulating. It was well-written.
It did all the John Stuart Mill things about making one think again,
and questioning one’s own positions, that you would like a book
to do. If you have an interest in constitutional law, and whether
you classify yourself as a libertarian, a majoritarian, or something
else again, put this book on your list to order.
In the rest of this article I will do two things. Firstly, I will
give an overview of Somin’s book. Then, secondly, I will say why
I did not find its rejection of majoritarianism to be convincing. As
for the overview, this is a seven-chapter book with an introduction
and conclusion. The first chapter runs through a host of data, at
times depressing, indicating the levels of political ignorance. Put
more bluntly, Somin tells you just how little the preponderance of
voters actually knows about issues and, well, facts. The second
chapter considers whether, nevertheless, they know enough basic
facts to pass the implicit hurdles of various theories of
representative democracy. Somin concludes that the answer is
“no.” “Public knowledge levels fall well short of the requirements
of normative theories of political participation” (p. 73). Then the
author moves to arguing that this political ignorance is
“rational”—not a sign of stupidity, but of rationality. “Political
ignorance is rational because an individual voter has virtually no
chance of influencing the outcome of an election—possibly less
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than one in one hundred million in the case of a modern U.S.
presidential election” (p. 75). Somin says this point applies as
much to “highly altruistic and civic-minded citizens as to narrowly
self-interested ones” (p. 78). There is a caveat however. “[I]t turns
out that the decision to vote is rational so long as the voter
perceives a significant difference between candidates and cares
even slightly about the welfare of fellow citizens, as well as his or
her own” (p. 80). Refinements on this get considered, such as
possibly caring about the size of a mandate, and how “some other
reason not clearly related to voting” (p. 97) will, in Somin’s view,
be the most powerful determinant of one’s political knowledge.
That is the first half of the book, more or less, in which the
author analyzes the nature and extent of the problem of political
ignorance in a democracy like the United States. Lots of data; lots
of social science; lots of asserted ignorance, albeit of a sort claimed
also to be rational. Then the last four chapters shift to considering
what Somin considers to be potential solutions. As noted above,
Somin is pessimistic about voters becoming better informed any
time soon. That is chapter seven, the last one. Nor does Somin
think that various “shortcut” aids that might guide voters are
sufficient to overcome his earlier critiques. Yes, there is
“considerable merit” to the argument that “voters can infer
candidates’ policy stances from their partisan affiliations rather
than undertaking the much more difficult task of inquiring into
the views of each individual aspirant to office” (p. 109). But there
is not enough merit to this claim, says Somin. Nor is there enough
from the idea that voters might follow the lead of “opinion
leaders” (p. 115), or that voting based on past performance,
“retrospective voting” (p. 117), might on balance do the trick.
That is chapter four, which even looks at the Condorcet jury
theorem (p. 133).
That leaves just chapters five and six. The former is about
what Somin calls “foot voting,” or moving to jurisdictions with
policies more palatable to the individual. In the United States that
means moving between the various 50 States. This ties in to
federalism and the decentralization of decision-making. Somin is
a fan of this foot voting, despite recognising and detailing the
admitted costs. With foot voting, the incentives, he says, are better
than when it comes to ballot-box voting. Accordingly, for the
author (and when it comes to seeing the upsides of foot voting I
am more than a little sympathetic, and certainly agree with the
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author’s support of federalism), this counts as a real solution to
the problem of political ignorance. The other claimed solution to
the problem laid out in chapter six, an even more crucial solution
for Somin on my reading of the book, is strong judicial review—
unelected judges being given the power to invalidate or strike
down the elected legislature’s laws on the basis of their
interpretation of a written constitution.8 It is here where I strongly
differ with the author and here that I will focus in what remains
of this review. He rejects majoritarianism. I think it is the leastbad option going. Even more to the point, I think majoritarianism
is the only option that has any chance at all of delivering anything
like the first-order substantive policy positions Somin favors.
Why? Start by remembering that Somin’s critique of
majoritarianism is not intended as some sort of brief for Euroleftism or for the democracy-enervating—I would say democracyemasculating—arrangements of the European Union. No, it is
meant as a brief for judicially enforced constitutional rights that
will deliver broadly libertarian outcomes. And yet Somin’s dislike
or distrust of majoritarianism is certainly extremely reminiscent
of the attitudes of, say, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the
European Commission, who talks as though there are a good
number of things more important than letting-the-numbers-count
democracy.9 Not terribly dissimilarly, Somin’s tone is of the
“democracy is okay within limits, old chap, but let’s keep a firm
lid on things” variety. Here is how the author puts it:
Unlike Plato and the totalitarians, I do not argue for a complete
rejection of democracy. I accept the evidence that democracy
generally functions better than alternative systems of
government… [including because democracies are] more likely
to avoid major policy disasters and do not commit mass murder

8. Such is the relatively recent growth in the extent to which common law judges
around the English-speaking world are prepared to second-guess and gainsay elected
legislatures that one could argue that this is happening even in jurisdictions without a
written constitution, meaning in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. I make just such
an argument myself. See James Allan, Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You
Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s Clear Intention and You Shake It All About –
Doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 108 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
9. “Monetary policy is a serious issue. We should discuss this in secret, in the
Eurogroup […] I’m ready to be insulted as being insufficiently democratic, but I want to
be serious […] I am for secret, dark debates.” Jean-Claude Juncker, quoted in Valentina
Pop, Eurogroup Chief: I’m for secret, dark debates, EUOBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2011, 10:01
AM), https://euobserver.com/economic/32222.

ALLAN_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

484

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/17 7:04 AM

[Vol. 32:479

against their own people…. But the superiority of democracy
over other forms of government leaves open the possibility that
democracy might function better if its powers were more
tightly limited” (p. 9, internal footnotes omitted and emphasis
mine).

“Phew,” was my first reaction on reading that it was not to be a
complete rejection.
More seriously, Somin builds up a case that focuses on facts.
“Throughout this book, I focus primarily on political knowledge
defined as awareness of factual matters related to politics and
public policy” (p. 9). The explicit thesis he lays out is that the
voters simply do not have enough knowledge of those facts. Of
course, that alone is not enough to defeat my sort of “democracy
is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time”10 Churchillian defense of
majoritarian democracy. Hence Somin also relies, implicitly, on
an unspoken premise that some sort of caste of experts—be they
unelected judges or bureaucrats or something else again—that
does have this knowledge of facts, and (to make the argument
work properly) has it to a noticeably higher degree than do the
voters, will tend to make better decisions, all things considered
(including taking account of the costs of this sort of paternalism,
whose costs Somin ignores). I will be blunt here and say straight
out that I am skeptical as regards this Sominian unspoken premise
or faith in a caste of experts. I doubt very much that such experts
would outperform majoritarian democracy—which I stress again
is a comparative claim on my part, not a rose-tinted brief for
majoritarianism as some sort of unsullied good.
Take the euro currency in the European Union. A more topdown, expert-imposed policy decision is hard to imagine. It is
overwhelmingly likely that the German voting population would
have rejected it out of hand, if ever they had been given the
opportunity to have a say. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems
pretty clear that it was a mistake for some countries to enter into
this new supranational currency, and in the long term that
probably includes Germany. The fact-filled experts misfired.
Likewise with immigration in Europe, at least if you believe that
Angela Merkel’s recent unilateral decision to welcome a million
people claiming to be refugees counts as a decision that was taken
10.

444 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) col. 203 (UK).
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outside of majoritarian constraints—which looks very plausible in
the light of the results for her political party since she announced
that decision.
Other examples are hardly difficult to list. The EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy is another expert-driven policy. Its
long-term effects may be amongst some of the most insidious and
malign going for whole swathes of the Third World. Or take any
of the various United Nations bodies. When the United Kingdom
attempted to reform its welfare laws to link government housing
supply more directly to the number of inhabitants via a “bedroom
tax,” which was a much less sweeping welfare reform than what
Bill Clinton signed into law in the United States, the UN’s Special
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel Rolnik—who surely
must qualify on the face of things as an “expert”—called for the
immediate suspension of this so-called bedroom tax.11 Or, again,
there is the UN Panel that found in favor of the claim made by
Julian Assange, of WikiLeaks notoriety, that he has been
subjected to “arbitrary detention.” This Panel, by a 3-1 count,
recommended Mr. Assange’s immediate release and (for good
measure) some monetary compensation.12 Again still, at least if
one is inclined to count the United Nations Human Rights
Council as possessing expertise when it comes to human rights,
then there is the fact that it—together with the United Nations
General Assembly—has issued more resolutions alleging rightsinfringing conduct against Israel than against all other countries
on Earth, combined! And note that all of the examples in this
paragraph are happily free of the taint of majoritarian decisionmaking.

11. U.N. Rep. of the Hum. Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on
the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, Dec. 30, 2013, U.N. Doc A/HRC/
25/54/Add.2 (2013), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13
/191/93/PDF/G1319193.pdf?OpenElement. See too the Special Rapporteur’s interview in
The Guardian newspaper, Amelia Gentleman, ‘Shocking’ Bedroom Tax Should Be Axed,
Says UN Investigator, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
society/2013/sep/11/bedroom-tax-should-be-axed-says-un-investigator.
12. This conclusion seems patently absurd to me. But there is no denying that the
people who made it would be classed as “experts.” See U.N. Rep. of the Hum. Rights
Council, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its SeventyFourth Session, 30 November–4 December 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2015 (2016).
For what it is worth, the former director of public prosecutions in England, Ken Macdonald
QC, characterised the reasoning of these “experts” as “beyond parody.” I’m inclined to
think Mr. Macdonald was being too kind.
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However, and despite the fact I could go on and on in these
types of realms with similar examples of supposed “experts” with
great knowledge reaching extremely suboptimal results, perhaps
all this is unfair to Somin. There is nothing in the book that
indicates he has any fondness for the supposed expertise flowing
from European Union officials or commissioners, or from any
United Nations body. So let us take an example of the results of
claimed expertise somewhat closer to home. Universities are
packed full of smart people who have as much knowledge of facts
as any people alive. How do such experts do when it comes to
running universities themselves? Not well, by my way of
thinking.13 In fact I lean towards agreeing with William Buckley’s
famous line that he would rather entrust the government of the
United States to the first 400 names in the Boston phone book
than to the faculty of Harvard University. Still unfair to Somin?
Okay, so forget that too. How about the many experts who have
designed and implemented the Affordable Care Act, admittedly
a change passed by the elected legislature? Are these the sort of
experts Somin has in mind as non-ignorant decision-makers,
people he believes will deliver the sort of small government and
free market outcomes he wants?
I suppose what I would have liked to have read in this book
is why Somin believes that in the long-term experts (however he
would end up defining that term) will have a better hit rate than
voters in delivering the sort of first-order substantive outcomes he
wants. Put differently, if you are going to pour the cynical acid of
public-choice-type theory on voters, why not pour it on “experts”
and on unelected judges too?
And that takes me to chapter six of the book, the one in
which Somin makes his positive case for strong judicial review.
After all, perhaps the only experts Somin really has any faith in at
all to oversee, guide and gainsay the voters are the top judges in a
common law jurisdiction, or, more narrowly still, maybe it is just
the top judges in the United States. If so, it is here that he and I
really part company. In effect, Somin rejects or significantly
downplays (depending on your reading) the so-called
countermajoritarian difficulty. He does not fully endorse what he
calls “the radical interpretation of the impact of voter ignorance”
13. In the Australian context, see James Allan, Why Australian Universities Are Not
Good Enough, QUADRANT, Mar. 2014, at 81.
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(p. 185), which asserts that voter ignorance means that no
legislation truly reflects the will of the majority, so that while
judges cannot “simply overturn legislation anytime they wish …
they should not refuse to overturn it for fear of acting in a
countermajoritarian fashion” (p. 186).
Instead, after noting that he believes “the radical view has
some merit” (p. 186), Somin concedes that some legislation does
in fact reflect majority will and where that is not clear there is still
the chance it has “penetrated the barriers of political ignorance
despite the odds against such an occurrence” (p. 186). So the
author prefers a less radical, more moderate approach under
which “the problem of political ignorance does not completely
eliminate the countermajoritarian difficulty but does greatly
reduce its significance” (p. 187). Basically this “moderate”
approach boils down to asserting that “[s]ince most legislation has
only limited majoritarian significance, if any, countermajoritarian
concerns should be far more easily outweighed by other
considerations than earlier theories suggest” (p. 188). What
counts as falling within the ambit of “those other considerations”
Somin does not tell us. Such a “complete theory of the range of
values that should influence constitutional decision-making by the
judiciary is outside the scope of this chapter” (p. 188), according
to the author.
Put differently, Somin thinks that worries about the
countermajoritarian difficulty—in my terms, the worry or
difficulty that you will not achieve good long-term outcomes when
a handful of unelected ex-lawyer judges are deciding a host of
social policy issues over the heads of 300 million plus citizens, and
doing so by themselves (as Jeremy Waldron14 has shown),
employing the strictly majoritarian procedure of 5 beats 4
counting of judicial votes—amount to very little indeed. For him,
it is “the ‘correct’ theory of constitutional law” (p. 188) that
overwhelmingly matters with majoritarian concerns being
tangential, at best. Heck, Somin goes so far as to say (though,
truth be told, I found this point hard to follow, if not smacking of
Alice in Wonderland) that strong “judicial review sometimes
actually increases the majoritarianism of the political system by
reducing the anti-majoritarian impact of voter ignorance” (p. 189,
14. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts,
123 YALE L.J. 1626 (2014).
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emphasis in the original). I think Somin’s claim here is that
unelected judges can help keep the size of government more
limited, and indeed limit what government does more generally
(p. 190), though why we should pre-suppose that a majority of
voters in some actual jurisdiction will or ought always to prefer
that is beyond me. Likewise, whether today’s top common law
judges are a force for smaller government and less bureaucratic
activity is clearly an empirical issue—a question of fact as Somin
would put it—and personally I am very skeptical on that front too.
Indeed, Somin hedges his bets by later saying that this supposed
representation-reinforcing effect “applies only to judicial actions
that limit the powers of other branches of government over the
private sector,” not to “[j]udicial decisions that replace the power
of other branches with judicial control” (p. 191). But that seems
like cherry-picking to me, as there will always be a few cases from
a top court to fit just about any theory or worldview.
At any rate, I hope that suffices to give a sense of where
Somin attempts to take the reader. Remembering that my support
for majoritarianism is of the “least-bad option available” variety,
I will finish this article by raising what I think are two significant
problems for the author’s distrust of, dislike for, and
disappointment with majoritarian democracy vis-à-vis strong
judicial review.
Firstly, I think there is more to the fact/value dichotomy than
Somin appears to think. Somin tells the reader right at the start
that he will focus on “awareness of factual matters related to
politics and public policy” (p. 9); that “[d]isagreement over some
issues, such as abortion, may largely be determined by conflicting
fundamental values, with little role for factual information” (p. 11,
internal footnote omitted); but that on “a vast range of major
political issues … differences … turn primarily on disagreements
over how to achieve widely agreed-upon goals, such as economic
prosperity, crime reduction, environmental protection [and
more]” (p. 11). So the picture he paints is one where social policy
choices (outside of, perhaps, one’s preferred abortion regime)
would become largely self-evident provided all of the disputants
knew (or agreed on) all of the facts.
Yet I doubt that very much. From way back in my doctorate
days onwards I have been in David Hume’s philosophical camp,
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and certainly preferred him to Immanuel Kant.15 I think Hume is
correct that reason is inert and that it is the sentiments that move
action, so the Humean conception of reason strikes me as more
plausible than the Kantian one; I think Hume’s right too about
the naturalistic fallacy—his point that there is an error involved in
attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is” (though, as with
Utilitarians, you can dissolve away all “oughts” and make them
functions of the “is,” of what happens to make the greatest
number of humans happy, and doing that will not breach Hume’s
Law); and I think Hume’s position against moral realism and in
favor of moral scepticism or non-cognitivism—that moral
evaluations do not possess a mind-independent status—is also
correct. Put differently, and leaving aside the philosophy, it is not
just facts about the external, causal world that determine people’s
preferred social policy positions. We all bring different sentiments
and preferences to the table. So we can know (or agree) all the
costs of climate change and of a carbon tax and yet some will want
to forego “5 units” of current consumption, some “20 units,” and
some will want to put money into coping with a changed world
rather than foregoing any current consumption by cutting
emissions. Or take the purely economic realm. Is it irrational or
against reason to prefer to reduce relative inequality, even if (let
us assume) such inequality-reducing-steps would lower a society’s
overall wealth levels, and indeed would even make the bottom
quintile of the population poorer? I don’t think so. Some people
might simply prefer or value more relative equality to preferring
more overall wealth in society, or even to preferring more
absolute wealth for the bottom quintile than what they would
have if inequality were not being reduced. Now that favoring of
more equality over more absolute wealth (or more absolute
wealth for those at the bottom) would not be my preference, nor
would it be Somin’s. But neither is the holding of that preference
irrational, at least not on the Humean understanding of reason.
Somin seems to me to skate over these deep philosophical
matters and just assume that most of the time “the facts” will do
the work (or enough of the work) needed to resolve disagreement
so that all that stands in the way of knowing what to do is political
ignorance. Hence, for Somin, we just need to inject a bit of
15. See JAMES ALLAN, A SCEPTICAL THEORY OF MORALITY AND LAW (1998). Or
better yet, see J. L. MACKIE, HUME’S MORAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1980) and J. L. MACKIE,
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1991).
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aristocracy (of the modern judicial variety rather than the older
land-holding sort) into the political system and by doing that we
will outperform the calls that would be made under a majoritarian
set-up driven by the voters, such as you see most clearly in New
Zealand (which, by the way, ranks higher in terms of economic
freedom than does the United States, with its strong judicial
review16), or the United Kingdom before it entered the European
Union. Of course if, say, a lawyerly caste from which the top
judges are chosen tends, on average, to hold different political and
social druthers than the majority of voters, then on my premises
factual knowledge (or voters’ ignorance of facts) would not be the
only variable. The values being brought to the table by the
ultimate decision-makers would matter too. Relatedly, if you
frame issues and goals in vague and amorphous enough terms
(“crime reduction,” “environmental protection,” “security
against the threat of attack” (p. 11)), then you can follow Somin
and assert that “differences … turn primarily on disagreements
over how to achieve widely agreed-upon goals” (p. 11). However,
that seems to me to be because you have finessed disagreement
by moving your focus up to the Olympian heights of “widely
agreed-upon-goals.” Make things sufficiently general, sweeping
and generic and of course you are far more likely to find
overwhelmingly shared human sentiments that then only require
knowledge of likely facts to point you towards what to do. But
descend down from those heights towards the quagmire of dayto-day detail and all those shared sentiments across the
population start to dissipate. And then “knowing the facts” is not
enough to make the decisions with the best long-term
consequences. You need also to know what people’s differing
sentiments or preferences or values are, and no one knows those
better than you do, the voter, and certainly not a committee of
unelected ex-lawyers. Or so it seems to me, which is why on
reading this book I was not convinced by the author’s division of
labor between facts and values.

16. In fact, in the 2016 rankings New Zealand ranked 3rd, the United Kingdom
(another jurisdiction without strong judicial review as it too lacks a written constitution)
and Australia (which has a very American-style Madisonian written constitution but of the
initial Madisonian sort, without any bill of rights, and so the strong judicial review is
overwhelmingly restricted to federalism issues) both tied for 10th place in the rankings, and
the United States was in the 16th spot. See FRASER INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE
WORLD: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2016).
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I mentioned above that I thought there were two significant
problems with the book’s attack on majoritarianism and support
for judicially enforced constitutional rights of a broadly Richard
Epsteinian sort. The second problem I note now is not
philosophical at all, but rather wholly empirical. Put bluntly, I do
not see why someone with Somin’s (and, broadly, my) substantive
preferences for small government outcomes thinks today’s top
judges are likely to deliver them. Sure, I can well understand why
someone with broadly big government, left-leaning first-order
druthers might think that today’s top judges are more likely to
satisfy his or her preferences than are the majority of voters
through the institutions of elected representative government.
What I am not sure about is why a libertarian-leaning smallgovernment man thinks his best bet is the judges. Now I concede
that perhaps my scepticism here has to do with the fact that I am
not American. I know what the judges are doing in Canada and in
the United Kingdom and in Australia and New Zealand. Give me
the elected politicians any day, and not because they have a
sterling track record but because—all things considered—they
seem to me to have a better track record. Or rather, given my
Hobbesian small government views and sentiments the elected
legislature tends to do better.
Maybe, though, things are different in the U.S. Yet from my
outsider’s vantage it just does not appear that way. There are few
Scalia-like originalists to be found amongst the upper echelons of
the American judiciary. Even a Republican appointee to the
Supreme Court votes to uphold the Affordable Care Act, and
does so in the face of an attack founded in federalist constitutional
considerations (of the sort Somin extols). Where, I wonder, are
“the facts” that support the view that in the United States strong
judicial review will deliver the sort of first-order substantive
outcomes Somin wants to see prevail? I would have liked to see
the book try to make that case more directly, that the gainsaying
and overseeing judges now in office have the remotest likelihood
in the near- to medium-term future—using the machinery of
strong judicial review based on interpreting the United States
Constitution (and, to be clear, I mean the sort of “living
Constitution,” non-originalist sort of approaches to constitutional
interpretation that seem to me presently to be ascendant)—of
enforcing constitutional outcomes of a broadly libertarian nature.

ALLAN_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

492

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/17 7:04 AM

[Vol. 32:479

CONCLUSION
Let me say it again: This is a thought-provoking book that
repays the time spent reading it. Yes, ultimately, its main thesis
left me unconvinced. I think that majoritarian democracy, which
includes a Popperian capacity to “throw the bums out” that is
lacking in all aristocratic or expert-driven decision-making setups, for all its flaws and all the political ignorance of the voters
who are given such a big role, nevertheless still offers the leastbad way to govern tens and hundreds of millions of people. Ilya
Somin thinks otherwise. After you have read his book you will be
better placed to decide for yourself.

